


# Secure Collaborative Digital Twins of Smart Factories

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U.S. Workshop on Multidisciplinary Digital Twins in the Built Environment

Digital Twin = interacting computational models + Real-time data from physical assets





## Research Objectives


- Authenticated twins
- Secure data sharing

## Undeniable Authentication of Digital Twins of Smart Microfactory

- Restrict commands/design specs to synchronized twins
- Accountability for actions undertaken by twins
- Inculpability for actions not undertaken by twins
- Prevent Unsynchronized twins from identifying the twins which exchanged the commands/ design specs




## Confirmation Protocol



## Disavowal Protocol

## Data Relay in Federated Digital Twins of Smart factories

- Fidelity Levels: Network Digital twin, AM Digital twin
- Data relay: AM-DTOrg -> PoC-DT->ES->PoC-DT-> AMDT
- Commands/Design specs hidden from PoC-DTs and ES




## Elliptic Curve based Proxy Re-encryption scheme

**Originator PoC-DT:** PRESIF Protocol  
embeds file content into elliptic curve point M and computes its hash  $h = H(M)$   
Chooses random secret r  
Computes ciphertext as  $C_{Org} = (C_T, C_M, h_M)$   
Where  $C_T = r \cdot Pk_{Org}$   $C_M = r \cdot P + M$ .

**Edge Server (proxy):**  
Re-encrypts:  $C_{Proxy} = (C'_T, C_M, h_M)$   
Where  $C'_T = C_T \cdot rk_{Org \rightarrow Dst}$   $rk_{Org \rightarrow Dst} = sk_{Org}^{-1} \cdot sk_{Dst}$

**Destination PoC-DT:**  
Decrypts  $M^{Dst} = C_M - sk_{Dst}^{-1} \cdot C'_T$  Checks  $h_M \stackrel{?}{=} H(M^{Dst})$


## RESULTS



No significant delay introduced

$$Prob_{Forge} = \frac{2 * q_s}{p-1} + \frac{2 * q_d}{k+1}$$

High unforgeability for large p, k



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## Networked Digital Twins in AM Factory Security Vulnerabilities

- Device Diversity
- Weak Communication Protocols

Data outflow from machines and sensors and influx into digital twins - vice-versa

Goal: accessibility, integrity, accuracy, trust

### Data Sharing

MiTM  
Forgery/ spoofing  
Injection  
DoS  
Insider attacks

Solution:  
Authentication  
Access Control  
Confidentiality